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Recent Developments In The Law O f Evidence
I have been asked to speak to you for a few minutes this after­
noon on recent developments in the law of evidence. I would 
ask that you keep in mind that the word “recent” is a relative term; 
much of our law of evidence has evolved through the common law and 
the authorities in some instances are centuries old.
I think the law relating to blood tests could be considered a re­
cent development. As to tne weight to be given such evidence, the 
decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in W elstead v. Brou n, 1 is 
important. In that case the legitimacy of a child was in question. 
E\idence of the chemical analysis of blood samples taken from the 
husband, the wife and the child indicated it would be impossible for 
the husband to be the father of the child. Mr. Justice Cartwright, 
referring to this evidence at p. 474, stated:
"In this case, however, the evidence of two qualified medical 
practitioners was to the effect that tests carried out with 
samples of the blood of the appellant, of his wife, and of the 
child indicated that if the child were born of the wife, as is 
admitted, then it was not merely improbable but impossible 
that the appellant was the father.”
He concluded at p. 475:
“I wish to make it plain that what I regaid as being decisive 
is the fact that the evidence was to the effect that the appell­
ant could not be the father of the child.”
This case is indicative of the weight and conclusiveness of such 
evidence. •
Now as to the admissibility of a blood test: As might be expected, 
particularly in criminal trials, there has been a conflict of judicial opinion. 
Some were of opinion that the rules governing the admissibility of a 
blood test were analogous to those relating to a confession, so well known 
to all of you, namely, that before such evidence could be given the jury 
must be satisfied that the blood test was carried out with the consent 
of the accused and there was an absence of threats, fear or compulsion. 
This was the view adopted by the Alberta Court in Rex v. Ford  2 by 
the Quebec Court of Appeal mR ex v. Frechette3 and in the unreport­
ed decision of R ex v. Gagnon in 1951.
However, courts in other jurisdictions differed from this approach. 
The Ontario Court of Appeal in Rex v. M cN am ara4 refused to follow 
Rex v. Ford  and held that the evidence of a blood test taken when the 
accused was in no condition to give consent was admissible: the analogy 
to a confession was denied. Tne Ontario Supreme Court in 1950 in 
the unreported decision of Rex v. Linquard  was to the same effect.
1. [1952] 1 D .L .R . 465.
2. [1948] 1 D .L .R . 787.
3. (19481 93 C.C.C. I l l ,  aff'd ., (1949 ) 94 C .C.C . 392.
4. [1951] O R. 6.
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There are provisions in the Criminal Code respecting chemical 
analysis: these are contained in s. 224 (3) and (4); s. 2z4 pertain­
ing to chemical analysis refers only to the previous two sections. S. 
222 deals with the offence of driving while intoxicated, while s. 223 
pertains to driving while the ability to drive is impaired. The effect 
of s. 224 is that the analysis of. blood may be admitted in evidence, 
notwithstanding that an accused person was not, before he gave the 
sample, warned that he need not give a sample; and it further provides, 
in subsection (4), that there is no obligation upon an accused person 
to give such a sample and that a refusal should not be commented 
upon at the trial.
This rather unsatisfactory state of affairs pertaining to the ad­
missibility of blood tests was, I think, settled in a very recent decision 
of the Supreme Court of Canada, T he Attorney General for Quebec 
v. Begin. 6 In that case the accused was convicted of what is known 
as motor-manslaughter. At the trial the Crown proved intoxication 
by means of evidence of a blood test. The accused had consented to 
give a sample but he had not been warned that the analysis of the sample 
might be tendered in evidence against him. The question of the ad­
missibility of such evidence was fully considered by the members of 
the Court and the conclusion and rule to be followed appears to be 
well set out in a part of the headnote of this case which reads as 
follows:
“Under the general law, as it was before the addition of 
s-s 4 (d) of s. 28.r) of the Code,” [this refers to the section of 
the 1927 Code] "evidence of a blood test taken without a 
warning is admissible. The contrary view is based on a mis­
apprehension of the reason and object of the confession-rule 
and of the privilege-rule both of which are related to the very 
substance of the declarations made respectively by an accused 
or a witness. The taking of a blood test does not give rise to 
the application of these rules nor does the fact that while the 
method used to obtain a blood test might be illegal and give 
rise to civil or criminal recourses, renders, per se, inadmis­
sible the evidence resulting herefrom.”
The Chief Justice’s views were clearly at pp 595 and 596
as follows:
“In the present case the accused consented, but I agree with 
the judgment in the McNamara case that even if he had not 
asked and therefore had not consented the evidence would 
he admissible.............
“In my view a confusion has arisen between the rules as to 
the admissibility of statements, or admissions, and those relat­
ing to self-incrimination. In taking a blood test the accused 
does not say anything because he is not asked any question.
Nothing in this judgment is to be taken as weakening the 
effect of the rules as to the admissibility of statements, or 
admissions, because the two matters are entirely distinct.”
Let me now turn to changes in the statutory law of evidence. As 
you know, the new Canada Evidence Act is contained in Chapter 307
5. [1955] S.C .R . 593.
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of the Revised Statutes of Canada, 1952. There were 110 changes 
made in this Act in the Revised Statutes. In the same year we hacl a 
revision of New Brunswick statutes and the New Brunswick Evi­
dence Act is now contained in Chapter 74 of the Revised Statutes of 
New Brunswick, 1952. Three new sections were added to this Act.
S. 14 deals with the cffect of disbelief in an oath; it provides:
“Where an oath has been administered and taken, the fact 
the person to whom it was administered and by whom it was 
taken did not at the time of taking the oath believe in the 
binding effect of the oath shall not, for any purpose affect the 
validity of the oath.”
There was also included a provision as to the number of expert 
witnesses allowable. S. 22 provides that unless leave of the Court 
is obtained not more than three expert witnesses may be called by 
either side. Finally there is a provision which will permit evidence 
to be given of a cnild who is too young to understand the nature of 
the oath. I wonder how many of you were aware that until 1952 in a 
civil action the evidence of a child who was not old enough to take an 
oath would not be admitted. S. 23 now permits such evidence. Sub­
section (2) of s. 23 is also important: it provides that no action can be 
decided upon the evidence of a child of tender years unless such evi­
dence is corroborated.
I want to say a word about the admissibility of photographs as 
evidence at a trial. There are, even today, some Courts which hold 
that before a photograph can be admitted, the person who took the 
photograph as w ell as the person who developed'it must be called as 
witnesses. I myself have had this experience within the past few 
months. I. suggest to you that this is unrealistic and actually not neces­
sary. After all, when a witness goes in a witness box and gives oral 
testimony, he, in effect, says —  “the following words represent the 
facts as I saw them.” 1 suggest, therefore, that if this witness can 
say— “these photographs show the facts as I saw them,” this would 
be sufficient. Indeed, in New Brunswick, we have a strong authority 
concerning the admissibility of photographs and I believe it is fre­
quently overlooked. I refer to the decision of the New Brunswick 
Court of Appeal in Rex v. Arthur Bannister. 6 Photographs of the 
victim’s body were admitted into evidence. The late Cnief Justice 
Baxter said at p. 398:
"When these gentlemen recognize the photographs as being 
accurate portrayals of the condition of the charred remains, 
it seems immaterial to inquire as to the person who had 
taken them or when they were taken or as to those engaged 
in their development.”
There are also cases on the admissibility of motion pictures. An 
example of this type of evidence is contained in the decision of The 
Army &  Navy Department Store v. R etail W holesale &  Department 
Store Union. 7 In that case motion pictures of strikers who w'ere
6. (19361 10 M. P .R . 391.
7. i 19501 2 D .L.R . 850.
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picketing the premises were admitted by Chief Justice Fanis of the 
British Columbia Supreme Court. His Lordship stated that the ob­
ject or purpose of the admission of these photographs, however, was 
merely for the clarification of the verbal testimony given and not as 
proof of the facts. He further suggested that with modem innova­
tions old rutes of evidence would not necessarily remain static. As a 
matter of interest I know of two cases within the past year before our 
own Supreme Court, both of which are unreported, in which motion 
pictures were admitted into evidence. In all probability the use of 
motion pictures as evidence will become a common occurrence rather 
than a novel one.
Let me conclude my remarks with what I consider to be a some­
what prevalent practice in some of our courts. I refer to the tendency 
in some courts to permit evidence to be given subject to objection. 
Perhaps I am out of order in referring to this but to me this is a 
practice which is to be regretted. The admissibility of evidence in a 
criminal action is ruled upon immediately. However, the rules of 
evidence in a civil trial are not enforced with such strictness. It wou!d 
seem that the rules of evidence are comparatively simple, and if evi­
dence is tendered which is objectionable it should be ruled inadmis­
sible forthwith, and if such evidence is admissible it should be admitted 
as such and not subject to objection. W e frequently find that evi­
dence which is admitted subject to objection gets into the record, the 
case is argued on appeal and nothing further is done about it. W e do 
not know in manv cases whether the court bases its decision on such 
evidence or not. In fact we do not know whether or not such evidence 
has been rejected or actually admitted, the result being, freau6ntlv, that 
there is no ruling on the matter whatsoever. It is likely tnat in some 
cases this is the proper course to follow, that is to admit such evidence 
subject to objection, but I suggest this is too frequently done. In 
this regard I would like to refer to a portion of a recent article which 
appeared in Chitty’s Law Journal wherein the author refers to an old 
decision of W alker v. Frobisher ,8 which was decided 150 years ago. In 
referring to this the author said:
“A judge must not take it upon himself to say whether evi­
dence improperly admitted had or had not any effect upon 
his mind. In many cases it would appear very difficult for a 
judge to disabuse his mind of the effect that inadmissible 
evidence has had upon him. It may well be that he can 
disabuse his mind of the facts stated in that evidence but 
even a person of the greatest mental discipline would some­
times, if not often, find it extremely difficult to disabuse 
his mind of the atmosphere created by the hearing of that 
inadmissible evidence. If evidence is admissible, even if there 
be no jury, a judge ought to rule that it is inadmissible 
and refuse to hear it, because of the danger, not of his acting 
upon the facts known by that evidence, but of the danger 
that the atmosphere that the hearing of the evidence may 
create upon his mind.”
Donald M. Gillis, 
Saint John, N.B.
8. (1801) 8  Ves. Ju n . 70; 31 E .R . 943.
